Looking back into the 'Social Contract'

« But, what if such concerns apply only to emergency cases?

Should a political community guard itself against potential enemies from the beginning to such an extent that political rights should be viewed as a secondary value and therefore are considerably suppressed? This is a crucial dilemma of political thought and practice and one that puzzles even present day politicians. In cases of a constant external threat sometimes also appearing inside (cases of clandestine war) the fear haunting political community is such that they might reach the conclusion that the community is in a siege situation. Therefore, as it happened for instance sometimes in ancient Rome (a point appearing in SC) emergency solutions are sought. In the past in such cases the political system took on oligarchic tendencies. A contraction of authority in the hands of few was normally the answer to states of siege. Then one might expect, as the examples of the French and Russian revolutions show, the state to retaliate with terror. Today, of course, such extreme political means are used under serious institutional checks. However, a dilemma of that kind has not entirely disappeared. And the more the enemy of a political community acts in clandestine ways, the more is possible for the community to imitate the enemy and engage in clandestine war.

Such a state of affairs is quite difficult, especially if the war is protracted. Again people return to a hobbesian state of affairs wherein one suspects the other and the enemy becomes anyone close. It is then only through wise and delicate maneuvers (political decisions) that the community can find a way out of such tragic impasse. Maybe this is exactly the time of the “heroic legislators”, as Rousseau seems to suggest.

It becomes clear that Rousseau despises political violence and uncontrolled political conflict. In the fourth book of the SC he even appears distrustful of endless deliberation, between opposing political fractions:

“For long discussions, disagreements, violent quarrels set the stage for an imposition of individual interests and the fall of the state. This is less clear when two or more classes take part in the constitution of the State, as it happened in Rome with patricians and plebeians whose quarrels often shuttered the assemblies, even in the superficial than real, for due to this inner evil within the political body we had, so to speak, two States in one and,  while each one of them constituted a right State, we cannot be convinced that both at the same time made for a right State”.

… Anyhow, to sum up translating these points into modern language, political stability in the SC looks like what we could call “just pacification” as well as “institutional-procedural automation” (hence a downscaling of political passions-demands). These are justified by the expectation of an utmost joy in face of the advent of the good polity (political system).  Such incidents are historically detectable, especially when people are found tired, thirsty and hopeful of the coming of an “eternal peace” (for instance, after prolonged wars). Then even the coming of (or return to) a civilized state of affairs helps to bring about a widespread political consensus.

…{A note on the good government:}

“Do not therefore look for this hot debated criterion of a good government anywhere else: After all these we said above, we clearly see, I think, that a government under which, without foreign help, new naturalizations and colonies, citizens are abundant and multiply themselves, is beyond doubt the best. And the government which has its people shrinking out and perishing is the worst”.

(The “Social Contract” from a political science perspective, 2009, quotations from J. J. Rousseau, Selected Writings, London, The Collector’s Library of Essential Thinkers, 2005).